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CYBER W APONS 
ARE NOT 
CREATED EQUAL 
By Captain Christopher A. Bartos, U.S. Marine Corps 
Despite public phobia to the 
contrary, cyber attacks are no 
simple thing; great sophistication 
is required to bridge the 'Iogical-
physical divide,' where defense has 
a distinct advantage over offense. 
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oday's prevailing wisdom, both inside and out-
side the Department of Defense, is that offense 
dominates in the cyber domain. I Determining the 
balance between offense and defense arises with 
the emergence of every new military technology. Driv-
ing the current belief in cyber's offensive dominance is 
the idea that digital weapons-which rely primarily on 
manpower- are cheap to create, while society's overall 
dependence on the Internet creates a plethora of vulnera-
bilities for intrusion, exploitation, and attack.2 The primary 
benefit to the offense in the cyber domain is the lack of 
www.usni.org 
Military students man the computers in Pyongyang, North Korea, where 
Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un has hailed cyber warfare as a "magic 
weapon." The North Koreans did succeed in engineering the Infamous 
2014 Sony Pictures hack- but ultimately such a stunt Is "nothing more 
than a cyber prank." 
physicality. Cyber, unlike the other domains, is a hybrid 
of the logical and the physical, which means that intru-
sions, attacks, and defense occur at the "speed of light."3 
Yet cyber's greatest offensive advantage is the same factor 
that limits its overall effectiveness as a weapon, namely, 
the logical-physical divide. Bridging this steep divide is 
required if digital operations are to significantly impact 
the physical world. 
Cyber Misperceptions 
When compared to traditional arms manufacturing, the 
creation of mo t cyber weapons is not only cheap, but also 
easy to hide. Computers, Internet access, and manpower 
with the right education and skills are all one needs to 
begin hacking computers. This is likely the reason why 
even Kim Jong-Un, the leader of reclusive North Korea, 
calls cyber warfare a "magic weapon."4 Cyber attacks will 
only increase as more computers connect to the Internet 
and more people gain the skills to hack them. 
Misperceptions about cyber warfare are fueled by a cog-
nitive bias with regard to cyber intrusions and attacks. On 
any given day there are millions of attempted malicious 
operations within the cyber domain; any approximation 
for all attacks will likely be under-
estimated, considering the billions 
of people connected to the Internet 
and the automated way the simplest 
of malware searches for and attacks 
targets. Many of these attempts are 
blocked before they even can gain 
access to a system. Even if on a per-
centage basis the number of effec-
tive attacks is small, news reports of 
these attacks gamer media attention, 
increasing the perception that suc-
cessful cyber attacks are easy. 
Cyber attacks are hard for the 
same reason any attack is diffi-
cult-there are many steps involved 
in skirting the defenses of the ad-
versary. For military operations in ~ 
urban terrain, the Marine Corps ~ 
uses a template for successful at- i 
tacks: reconnoiter the objective, iso- ~ 
late the objective, gain a foothold, ~i 
and secure the objective.5 Success-
ful cyber· attacks require the same 
t 
in the system, and finally exploit that foothold to obtain 
the objective. Smart defenders can, and often do, spoil 
attacks on networks by interrupting this process at any of 
the four steps.6 This process will become even more dif-
fICUlt as cyber defenses are strengthened. Material losses 
from hacks have brought visibility from top-level corpo-
rate executives, prompting cyber defenders to strengthen 
their shielding structures even more and build network 
architectures with redundancy in mind- a principle every 
good communications officer in the military has imple-
mented for years. 
Offensive cyber weapons also face the dual problems 
of "perishability" and obsolescence. Perishability is when 
a cyber weapon is no longer effective after it has been 
used. Obsolescence refers to a cyber weapon becoming 
ineffective because of time. The vulnerability in a system 
that is exploited when an attacker uses a cyber weapon im-
mediately becomes well known to system administrators 
and those who developed the original code. Patches are 
written and, when installed, close the gap that the attack 
originally used. A cyber weapon is perishable because it 
is impossible to reuse as long as the system is updated. 
Obsolescence occurs by the same process except that 
the vulnerability is discovered and fixed before an attacker 
uses the cyber weapon. Unlike weaponry in the physical 
world, the development of cyber weapons and countermea-
sures happens at an incredibly rapid pace, meaning that 
attackers in cyberspace must constantly update their arse-
nals to have any hope of conducting a successful attack. 
process. Hackers must first conduct ~ 
reconnaissance on a tar et isolate Cyber enlisted students at the Naval Postgraduate School are training for the contingencies of the 
. g , new high-tech balliespace. ''To take full advantage of our nalion's substantial defensive and offensive 
that target from potential cyber de- cyber capabilities, planners must account for the proper strategic balance between the two." 
fensive support, gain the foothold 
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Since it is difficult for an attacker to know if a developed 
weapon has become obsolete, it is extraordinarily difficult 
to plan a truly effective cyber attack. Though these same 
factors affect the defender, who must constantly update 
systems and fix gaps in the defense, the burden of action 
rests on the shoulders of attackers. 
Minimal vulnerability also makes cyber weapons more 
defensive in nature. Missiles in hardened silos and ships 
in harbors are relatively well defended, reducing the incen-
tive to strike first because 
Attacks on confidentiality, commonly referred to com-
puter network exploitation (CNE) in the Department of 
Defense, are effectively a form of espionage. Breaches of 
confidentiality are actually intrusions rather than attacks, 
because they do not cause any damage per se. CNE is 
typically used to gather intelligence on computer systems 
as well as for any of the other myriad p«rposes crimi-
nals and nation-states want information. Intrusions into a 
system can serve a dual purpose in that they not only en-
able information extraction, 
but they can also provide a 
way to plant malicious code 
within a system or corrupt 
its data without the owner 
knowing. According to some 
cyber experts, this highlights 
the offensive nature of all 
malicious cyber actions.9 
Just because intrusions are 
necessary to further attack 
computer systems, however, 
does not mean that CNE tips 
the offensive-defensive bal-
ance in favor of the offense. 
each side can reasonably 
expect to use its weapons 
and defend itself success-
fully. Cyber criminals and 
nation-states can effectively 
hide and protect their cyber 
arsenals from other actors 
because of the complex na-
ture of cyber geography and 
good encryption. With cyber 
weapons moored safely in 
their cyber harbors, nation-
states have little advantage 
to striking first against an 
opponent.7 At first glance, 
the effects of obsolescence 
would seem to undermine 
this stability in the cyber 
world because a weapon has 
a "use it or lose it" advan-
tage. Not all cyber weapons, 
however, are created equal. 
The logical-physical divide 
between the cyber domain 
and all the other domains 
separates out low-level from 
high-level cyber weapons. 
Only complex, higher-order 
cyber weaponry can mean-
Iranian President Mahmoud AhmadlneJad (front and center) takes a 
2008 tour of the Natanz uranium enrichment facilities-soon to be the 
target of one of the most destructive cyber attacks to date, courtesy of 
the Stuxnet virus. ''The Stuxnet attack was effective because II focused 
on the Interface between the logical and the physical. .•.• 
Espionage networks his-
torically have the same 
capabilities of gathering 
intelligence as well as pro-
viding a network for po-
tential covert, malicious 
action. Espionage networks 
in themselves, however, do 
not change the offensive-
defensive balance because, 
outside of the intelligence 
gathered, it would be dif-
ficult to obtain a strategic 
advantage large enough to 
ingfully bridge this divide, making them less susceptible 
than low-level weapons to obsolescence. 
Bridging the Cyber Divide 
Design, planning, and implementation of effective 
cyber attacks must take into account the three basic ele-
ments to cyber security: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability.8 Confidentiality assures that only the appro-
priate owner can operate the system and that messages 
sent to and from that system can only be read by the 
intended recipient. Integrity refers to the completeness 
and accuracy of data used by the system for its various 
functions. Availability means an authorized user can use 
a system as anticipated. A cyber attack is an action that 
compromises any of these three legs of the security triad. 
Only attacks on the integrity of systems, however, are 
capable of bridging the logical-physical divide in any 
meaningful way. 
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prompt a nation to strike 
first and initiate a war. Intelligence gathering may even 
promote stability between. nations by reducing the amount 
of private information held by each side, creating a defen-
sively favored relationship. 10 
Another option of a cyber attacker is to deny authorized 
users the availability of their systems. The most common 
uses a technique known as distributed denial-of-service 
attacks, where hackers shut down computers or web sites 
by overloading a system's capacity with digital traffic. 
Availability attacks are commonly used by non-state ac-
tors but are also used by nation-states, such as when the 
"Guardians of Peace," later unveiled as North Korea, took 
down the website of Sony Pictures Entertainment in De-
cember 2014.11 These attacks garner a lot of attention but 
ultimately amount to nothing more than a cyber prank. 
Losses did occur, and effort was expended to correct the 
problem. From a strategic perspective, however, these at-
tacks hardly affect the offensive-defensive balance. As 
www.usnLorg 
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network architects design systems with inherent resiliency, 
the actual usefulness of such cyber pranks will diminish. 
Only with a massive, concerted effort to simultaneously 
bring down mUltiple systems could an availability attack 
have significant impact. 
Attacks against the integrity of computer systems aimed 
at translating digital information into real-world effects 
hold the greatest promise for cyber attackers. To date, the 
most effective known cyber attacks were the ones against 
Iran's nuclear program using the malicious computer 
worm Stuxnet. Stuxnet offers an excellent example of an 
integrity attack, where the software of the programmable-
logic controllers was altered to change the rate of spin in 
centrifuges used to enrich uranium. 12 The Stuxnet attack 
was effective because it focused on the interface between 
the logical and the physical-by corrupting the data that 
directly controlled how fast the centrifuges spun, the at-
tack destroyed the equipment necessary to produce weap-
ons-grade uranium. 13 Another example is the now-famous 
Aurora exercise, where the Department of Homeland Se-
curity destroyed an electric generator by inputting data 
that closed a breaker with the grid out of phase, thereby 
placing a catastrophic amount of torque on the generator. 14 
Cyber attacks targeting the integrity of systems are the 
most potent, but they are also the most difficult to success-
fully execute. An effective attack not only requires unau-
thorized entrance into the system, but also purpose-built 
malware that merges detailed knowledge of the target with 
excellent programming designed to exploit flaws in physical 
systems. The significant increase in expert manpower and 
time needed to create these weapons, as well as the in-
creased security needed to prevent their disclosure, signifi-
cantly increases their cost. Even if an adversary overcomes 
these difficulties to develop a potentially effective weapon, 
execution of the plan must be flawless. The increased intri-
cacy makes the overall attack more vulnerable where even 
the slightest hint that something is awry could throw the 
whole operation. Proponents of offensive dominance in the 
realm of cyber argue that the cost of offensive weaponry 
is far cheaper than defensive measures. The truth is that 
meaningful offensive weapons incur the high cost while 
the defender can easily and cost-effectively protect through 
good information practices, design, and the safeguarding of 
the critical logical-physical interface. 
'Defensively Oriented' 
Only the most sophisticated cyber attacks-requiring 
significant investments of manpower, expertise, time, 
money, and coordination-can bridge the logical-physical 
divide between the cyber domain and other domains to cre-
ate strategic, real-world effects. Even simple cyber attacks 
must incorporate multiple stages allowing the defender op-
portunities ttl break the offensive momentum. This is not 
to say that low-level attacks cannot have impacts-they 
can, and do, inflict damage and cost on the victim-but 
those impacts do not cross the threshold required to tip 
the balance in favor of the offense. Understanding that the 
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challenge of defending against high-level attacks pales in 
comparison to the difficulty of conducting them estab-
lishes that cyber is actually defensively oriented. 
Cyber presents a whole new arena for interactions be-
tween nation-states. Current U.S. policy purposely has 
avoided opening the Pandora's Box of escalation and re-
taliation in the cyber domain, despite calls by some to 
"come back at them."15 To take full advantage of our na-
tion's substantial defensive and offensive cyber capabili-
ties, planners must account for the proper strategic balance 
between the two. Abandoning the "cult of the offensive" 
in cyber is the first step toward achieving effective cyber 
operations, prudent policy, and real security. • 
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